Struggle for Brightsparks

Eddie Teo, chairman of the PSC, recently made a defence of the scholarship system in Singapore. Earlier this year, he wrote an open letter discussing the characteristics and qualities which scholars should ideally possess.

He was appointed chairman of the PSC only in 2008, and it seems he has been more vocal than his predecessors (taking a look at the public speeches published online at the PSC website). One can’t help wondering if there is any serious problem in the scholarship system currently run by the PSC, for its chairman to speak on it twice this year, with a similar focus.

Any discussion of the scholarship system here cannot avoid the sensitive issues of meritocracy, elitism, and even race. The scholarship system is also particularly vulnerable to political criticism by all sides; given that many scholars actually rise to high positions (remember the Tan Yong Soon cooking trip, which was such a hot online topic?), and any mis-step on their part hurts the reputation of the scholarship system.

Like it or not, the scholarship system (used here in general terms) is deeply entrenched in Singapore, to the extent it has become a cultural norm. When you point out to your friend that this guy or girl is ‘a scholar’, the immediate response will be ‘Wow’, with the understanding that he or she is likely to be brilliant, on an undergraduate scholarship sponsored by the government, and will someday hold leadership positions in the civil service. This seems to be an aberration of the term ‘scholar’ as widely used elsewhere, and truly uniquely Singaporean.

Lack of talent

Singapore’s rapid development was partly due to the existence of a strong and effective bureaucracy, which enabled the political leadership to implement economic and social policies. Furthermore, it is also recognised in economic studies that an efficient civil service, with sound legal and judicial institutions, can help to foster economic development, at least in the early stage. As a result, it has been ingrained in the mind of the political leadership that the Singapore civil service plays a major role in all aspects of governance. In fact most Singaporeans rely heavily on the work of the civil service, both ‘invisible’ and ‘visible’, to get by their daily lives.

Obviously the strength of the civil service lies in its staff – civil servants. As this The Economist article explains, the civil service will meet greater challenges:

It is not simply a matter of replacing one set of mandarins with another: in an age when most policy issues (from climate change to migration) cut across ministries and state boundaries, the civil servants of tomorrow will have to be lateral thinkers, not pen-pushers

Hence a stronger impetus for talented people to join the civil service. But as the article explains, the government competes for talent with the private sector. In other advanced economies, non-government organisations such as non-profit activist groups, charities etc compete for talent as well. Singapore doesn’t face this challenge, since we lack a vibrant NGO sector. Instead our talent is lured to the lucrative business sector, especially MNCs, given their omnipresence here.

Even if the government is able to recruit talent, it finds a hard time retaining them, as Singapore ministers have often lamented (citing this as a reason for the relatively high compensation paid to top civil servants). The Economist sums it up, “Today’s high-flyers want multi-disciplinary careers, the ability to rise as high and fast as their talents allow, and the freedom to move in and out of government work”, and “Even those keenest on working for the nation may find their loyalty tested”.

Hence the possible shortage of talent scenario in public service is real and clear.

Why Scholarship System

The scholarship system is nothing new here, and is in fact a remnant of the colonial government. Notable figures such as Dr Goh Keng Swee took up a government scholarship and returned to Singapore to fulfil their bonds. The colonial government’s intention was to use local talent in the administration, especially in the middle and junior levels, and also part of a half-hearted humanitarian policy to ‘educate’ some locals.

However, as the PSC stated, scholarships are now supposed to attract ‘the best and brightest’, and those with the passion to serve Singapore. Hence the PSC has a first-mover advantage: by sponsoring the education of talented people, they are binding them to public service for a few years, after which these talented people will (hopefully) remain in their jobs. This first-mover advantage is the reason why the scholarship system exists. It’s like you’re buying a house, and you’ve a row of houses to view. But one kiasu house owner approaches you directly, and offers you a ‘trial stay’ period. And his house is indeed fantastic, so you decide to buy the house and continue staying there, without reviewing other choices, even if some happen to be better.

Those with genuine passion are likely to continue in public service, while others may be tempted by the private sector. Hence the government throws in a few carrots: remunerations benchmarked to the private sector, fast-track career advancement, ministry rotations etc. Ditto for non-PSC, ministry-specific scholarships.

Many Problems, Few Real Ones

There are many perceived problems of the scholarship system in Singapore, but only a few are structural ones. The rest are largely superficial and do not really hurt the long-term objective, that is, to provide a first-mover advantage for the civil service.

There is one important structural defect of this system, which is also the causal factor of several criticisms hurled against the scholarships. It’s the problem of adverse selection. In this context, it means the possibility of ‘bad’ people receiving scholarships, because of information asymmetry between applicants and scholarship providers.

The benefits of a scholarship are well-known – a sponsored university education, stable job, fast-track career route and prestige bestowed by society (why we do this demands another write-up, but is it because of our Confucian tradition?). Hence these benefits will attract applicants, some with a genuine interest in public service, and some who just want a free ride (like this author).

For example, the PSC received over 2500 applications this year (lol personally I think this number seems inflated, because I think there are some people like me who want ministry-specific scholarships, but have to apply through a centralised system at the PSC website. Smart work of the PSC; it can grab all the potential talent, and then filter the rest which it doesn’t want to the separate ministries). Out of these, how many are passionate (and will remain) in public service? How many just want an overseas education paid by the government (the freeloaders)? Then there are those who are clearly not talented (like me), who cannot be groomed for top positions or simply not competent enough, yet also apply for their own reasons.

The PSC doesn’t know. All the applicants claim to be the ones the PSC is looking for. There is a need to match the interests of the PSC and that of the applicants. So the PSC solves this information asymmetry by screening. High barriers of entry are erected; you need to take 11 academic units to be considered for consideration for interview, excellent CCA records, testimonies of strong leadership etc. Throw in the psychological tests, and 14-man-strong interview panel with a couple of rounds before the ‘grand finale’, and the PSC effectively filters down to under a hundred successful applicants.

I don’t really believe the criticisms that the PSC ONLY looks out for straight-A students. But with so many applicants, with different capabilities, it is forced by the problem of adverse selection to take in the straight-A applicants and ignore the rest. Intellectual prowess is a signal by applicants that they have some potential in whatever the PSC wants, in their case, probably the need to be analytical of policies etc. Of course one doesn’t need straight As to analyse policies, and straight As don’t mean one can analyse policies well. Yet this is reality: because we lack complete information on each other, we’ve to depend on signalling and screening (sounds like dating).

So the emphasis on academic ability in Singapore is partly due to this information imbalance. Thus we’ve the criticisms coming along with it, about the inflexibility of the education system etc, how the scholars seem so similar in profile etc…

Secondly, the nature of government means the performance indicators of scholars (or other civil servants) are sometimes not hard-rock evidence. A statistician may be using a slower method of calculation, and hinders the rest of government services. In the private sector, because of competition, the statistician will be under pressure by his supervisor to improve on his technique, as the impact of his work on business profits may be directly felt. In contrast, the public sector statistician does not see the impact of his work directly, and he continues using his slower method unknowingly.

So how do we determine the efficiency and effectiveness of a scholar civil servant? Not sure. Do they provide the ‘booster’ as we expect? If we can’t measure their performance well, then why the scholarship system, given it also aims to groom future leaders?

No Solution, Only Words of Caution

Actually the scholarship system is part of the answer to the shortage of talent problem; bearing in mind others join the civil service upon graduation. Hence there is also a need to attract those who are still studying.

As I mentioned, the scholarship system is here to stay. But my generation presents some dangers which will harm this system if left unchecked:

First, if our scholars seek to advance only their self-interest, it indicates that they may be unable to work in a team. Much of public service work today involves teamwork because Singapore’s problems are becoming more complex and involve many Ministries, and no single individual can solve them. Besides, public policy making is always the product of a group effort, of repeated discussions and revisions. From the first idea to the Cabinet paper, proposals will involve many people and countless drafts. Some young officers are not used to this and do not feel a close enough sense of ownership with the final product. This is the way government works and is in fact a strength of our system because this is the way we gather different perspectives and considerations into a well thought-through solution. Second, if fewer and fewer young scholars desire ground postings, more and more of them may become divorced from ground issues and will start to lose their empathy for ordinary Singaporeans. The problem is not yet so widespread that it cannot be rolled back. There is still time for the Public Service to correct the trend.

(Eddie Teo, 31 October 2009; bolded words are mine)

Ironically, the demands of my generation seem to be on a collision course with the interests of the government. Looks like public service and scholarships need some job re-designing as well.

No, this Myth is Reality

I was reading this article by TOC, titled “The Myth of Asian-style Democracy”, when I thought how often people like to bring up old topics and tackle them from the same angles again and again. This issue of democracy-and-Singapore has probably been debated to death by academics, bloggers and coffeeshop uncles.

Personally I think democracy is too abstract a subject to be discussed by mortals like us. Being me, I don’t like to dishonour by simple discussion ideals as sacramental as democracy, human rights etc. But I think I should start someday, albeit with cautious, baby steps.

I’ll skip most of Alastair Su’s points, and focus on a few which I think can be demolished. First of all, he argues there are inconsistencies to this Asian-style democracy school of thought:

However, in light of sweeping political changes that have occurred in Asia, a number of inconsistencies begin to surface…

So, while places like Japan and Malaysia have not ended up as carbon copies of Western countries, these countries must have enjoyed some kind of vibrancy in their political climate – a supposed characteristic of Western countries – for these changes to have taken place.

Alastair summarised briefly what Asian-style democracy means, and I think all of us can guess its characteristics – lack of an active civil society, human rights et cetera. But it sounds rather outdated, given that the idea of Asian-style democracy was portrayed in 1994, before many changes which had enabled greater citizen participation in their countries. Hence I find that Alastair is bringing out a ghost from the past, because this whole thing of “Asian-style democracy” has probably dissipated since LKY touched on it.

In fact LKY probably made a mistake when he talked about the so-called “Asian values”. These values are too general to be applied to the entire continent, and within Asia itself, there have been different styles of democracies – some looking more like the Western form than others. So does this “Asian-style democracy” even exist in the past?

The second problem with the cultural argument is that it overlooks one huge reality – the fact that a society’s values are constantly changing.

Sure or not? I’ve a feeling the blogger doesn’t know what he is getting into. Values are not homogenous, and like the concept of democracy, pretty much debated by philosophers. Moral values certainly don’t change (killing, stealing, lying). Religious values may or may not change, as they are usually the ones being challenged (think of premarital sex or abortion). Ditto for cultural values, like filial piety being stretched because of the breakdown of traditional 3-generation-in-a-house living. My point is that Alastair has used the word “values” in such a superficial manner, that his argument becomes very much less convincing. So how is it linked to Asian-style democracy? Values change, so no more “Asian”?

Therefore, rather than asking the question: “What are Singaporean values, and how does that apply to a democracy?” we should be asking ourselves: “What is a democracy, and how does that apply to Singapore values”?

Alastair believes if we ask the latter question, we will have a different answer from the former question. Hence how Singapore is governed will be different too. I doubt so.

I’m not too sure if democracy is an absolute truth which is non-negotiable, like thou shall not kill. But I’ve a suspicion that democracy can be moulded into different forms to fit the context of the country. Using Malaysia as an example too, it has its own form of democracy. Yes, they have had change of state governments, possess an active civil society, freedom of press etc, but taking a closer look, democracy in Malaysia has been adjusted to fit its realities. One shining example is the special position and privileges of the Malay race. A full-blown Western-style democracy, whatever that means, will work less well than the Malaysian form.

I think Alastair and others should stop the use of “Asian-style democracy”. It probably doesn’t exist. Anyway, what is the problem with different styles of democracy, as long as it works? Are Singaporeans getting desperately uncomfortable with the present style of democracy here? Yes, no, maybe, but the PAP government has been flexible enough to introduce political changes, in anticipation of more demands.

Please, critics of democracy-and-Singapore, offer something new. Lol.

Town Council report: so what next?

Clearing the air on town council report

Published in The Straits Times, 3 Oct 2009

Letter from Thomas Seow
Deputy Director (Housing)
Ministry of National Development

I REFER to Monday's commentary by Ms Chua Mui Hoong, 'Town councils: Measure what matters to residents', and Wednesday's letter by Mr Harminder Singh, 'Hold local elections to raise accountability'.

The Ministry of National Development introduced the Town Council Management Report to facilitate informed discussions between town councils and residents on the management of housing estates.

Contrary to Mr Singh's view, the management report is not a response to the investment losses of a few town councils. Our intention is to start off simple, focusing on key areas of town councils' estate management functions that are objective and measurable. The extent of service and conservancy charge arrears is included as it directly affects town councils' financial health.

Ms Chua commented that the management report indicators depend too much on factors extraneous to town council management. Indeed, it is the intention of the management report to objectively reflect the state of the estate, which may depend on the town councils' performance as well as other factors. Residents can play a key part in helping their town council do its work well. It would not be appropriate to compare management report results across towns because of different property and resident profiles. Town councils and residents should compare their management report results over time to see how they have improved.

We agree with Ms Chua's suggestion of 'continuous assessment' instead of a 'single big exam'. Under the management report, each town council would have some blocks inspected every month, and all blocks would be inspected at least once a year.

Mr Singh suggested holding elections to town council posts. Town councils are led by elected Members of Parliament. In addition, the Town Councils Act ensures resident representation by requiring at least two-thirds of town council members to be HDB residents from the town.

The management report does not measure residents' views, as they are by nature subjective. However, the management report resource panel members and dialogue participants recognised that residents' views are important, and suggested that town councils do more to engage residents.

In particular, they could provide simplified, summarised financial information to residents and engage them on the results of the management report. Town councils should also help their residents better understand their estate management approach, for example, how their service and conservancy charges are used.

We will review the management report framework regularly to ensure it remains relevant.

(Retrieved from MND website)

Why are there product brochures? To publicise the product by detailing its characteristics, functions etc, so that the intended audience will purchase the product. Hence the firm can increase its revenue while consumers will gain from the use or enjoyment of the product. Both parties are happy.

So why are there town council management reports? According to the Ministry of National Development, they can “provide HDB residents with objective information on key areas of Town Council management. In this way, residents can be better informed about their estate, as well as understand better some of the challenges and trade-offs involved in managing their town” (MND website). From the above press letter, this will lead to “informed discussions between town councils and residents on the management of housing estates”.

The problem of detachment

Fair enough, HDB residents should have an official report on the state of their estate, and whether the town council is doing its job properly. Residents will definitely be better-informed, but some will challenge the accuracy of the report, especially in estate cleanliness. After all, there are different types of estates within the management of a town council, and each estate is further broken down into precincts. Residents in one filthy precinct will not be impressed if they see their town council scoring high on the cleanliness grade.

On the other hand, so what if a town council is given a Level 5 grading (the lowest) for estate cleanliness? The indicator used in the TCMR is “average number of cleanliness defects per block”. If the figure is more than or equal to 8, the town council will be given a Level 5 grade. The problem with this calculation is that some blocks will have more litterbugs than others, and when the sums average out, it seems all blocks might appear very dirty or very clean. Well, why should it matter for a HDB resident who really knows his block is clean?

Thus the problem with this TCMR is that residents have little attachment to the results i.e. they do not really care about how high or low their town council scores on the cleanliness or lift performance indicators, UNLESS it is their block which is really affected. They can simply know by comparing their own block to the next one. Why would they care about a block with poor cleanliness when it is 20 bus-stops away?

Responsibility comes with accountability

Given the TCMR is meant to reflect the state of all blocks of flats within the town council’s management, then residents will want to know why is their state of estate as such. So the town council will have to answer some questions.

And…what next? Will a lousy report pressurise the town councils to improve? Possible, but the TCMR is too brief and lacking in details to budge residents to pressurise their town councils. The town councils hold some responsibility, but little accountability to residents. A majority of councillors is from the town itself, and they are appointed by the chairman (a MP). These councillors are usually grassroots leaders in the constituencies. Most of them serve because of a genuine and altruistic purpose for the welfare of others. But the system is structured in a way which distances them from residents. They serve in different roles in the council, ranging from finance to projects to publicity. It is difficult to align their interests to that of the town council’s residents, when their roles may not have anything directly to do with the welfare of residents.

Hence who should the residents hold accountable for the state of their estate, besides themselves in certain areas?

Some Suggestions

As MND has stated, the TCMR is just a start and it will evolve. If it does, then it can be more detailed by providing a block-by-block breakdown of issues regarding cleanliness and lift performance. Even these two issues can be broken down, such as corridor cleanliness, void deck etc. By doing so, residents can see for themselves how ‘good’ their block is, and reduce the detachment between the TCMR and their daily lives. A comparison can be made as well, and both residents and town council can improve on specific areas.

In terms of accountability, the way in which town councilors is appointed can be changed so that it can be more representative of residents, and councilors can act as monitors on town council performance, as well as giving residents a more direct stake in their estate management. For example, a RC member from each precinct can be elected to the town council, and then tasked to be in charge of areas regarding cleanliness or arrears monitoring. If the report shows the precinct to be in need of improvement, then residents can hold the town council member accountable.

The TCMR, though it is new, should at least move toward this direction of improving both the town council’s performance and residents’ welfare. If not, it will be an exercise in futility of “informed discussions”.